Africa’s economic future cannot depend on Washington
Trump’s move to exclude South Africa and Rwanda from AGOA shows why Africa must accelerate its own economic integration.
CEO of Alafarika for Studies and Consultancy, Nigeria.
18 Nov 2026

On September 2 , United States President Donald Trump signed legislation extending the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) through the end of 2028, following overwhelming support in Congress. Yet just two months later, on November 2 , his administration announced plans to terminate the eligibility of South Africa and Rwanda for the programme from January 1, 2027.
The decision lays bare the fundamental weakness of AGOA: African economies depend on trade privileges that Washington can withdraw whenever its political priorities change.
AGOA is a US trade law that currently covers 33 eligible sub-Saharan African countries. It was enacted on May 18, 2000, to allow these countries to export thousands of products to the US market duty-free, and was promoted as a strategic mechanism to foster economic growth, expand trade between the US and the continent and encourage economic and political reforms.
AGOA initially delivered promising results. It is estimated to have supported more than 300,000 direct jobs across Africa and 1.3 million indirect jobs. According to a 2024 US Trade Representative report, two-way goods trade between the US and sub-Saharan Africa reached $47.5bn in 2023, including $9.7bn in imports under AGOA and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), of which $5.5bn consisted of non-oil products such as apparel and agricultural goods.
However, recent figures point to growing challenges, with some even suggesting a decline. A Congressional Research Service report shows that US imports receiving AGOA duty-free treatment dropped sharply from $7.9bn in 2024 to $5bn in 2025. Another analysis by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) noted that the share of US imports from sub-Saharan Africa benefiting from AGOA and GSP preferences plummeted from more than 80 percent in 2008 to roughly 24.7 percent in 2021 amid eligibility uncertainty and short renewal windows.
Only a few eligible sub-Saharan African countries capture most of the programme’s benefits. South Africa is its largest beneficiary, with exports to the US worth billions of dollars annually, while most other eligible countries struggle to make full use of its preferences.
Furthermore, because the US administers the programme’s preferences unilaterally, rather than through a bilateral treaty, Washington can exclude or reinstate any eligible country based on its own assessments and criteria, including market reforms, human rights and labour standards.
Since the programme’s inception, some countries suspended from AGOA have criticised the impact of their removal. Ethiopia’s suspension in 2022, for instance, led to the loss of thousands of garment sector jobs.
In practice, Washington’s geopolitical interests often carry more weight in eligibility decisions than AGOA’s stated criteria.
The Trump administration’s decision to terminate South Africa’s and Rwanda’s AGOA eligibility is a clear case in point. Both countries have pursued policies that conflict with Washington’s interests and that the administration regards as a threat. South Africa has strengthened its economic and political ties with US rivals such as China and Russia, while facing accusations from Washington of obstructing American trade and investment, alongside Trump’s allegations of a “white genocide”.
Rwanda’s alleged support for the M23 rebel group in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has also brought it into conflict with US interests in the region’s critical minerals.
Sharp declines in AGOA import values, unstable US trade policies, and short-term extensions leave African exporters highly vulnerable. Losing AGOA access triggers immediate customs setbacks, including tariff increases of 15 to 20 percent on some products. Ultimately, these unpredictable extensions prevent AGOA from building a self-sustaining African industrial base, making accelerated implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) an urgent priority for the continent.
Africa’s economic vision cannot remain hostage to changing administrations’ policies or unilateral decisions made abroad, as the continent needs to build strategic resilience and economic independence. The AfCFTA is a historic trade agreement signed under the auspices of the African Union (AU) on March 21, 2018, in Kigali, Rwanda, which officially entered into force on May 30, 2019, with trading beginning on January 1, 2021.
The agreement aims to bring African Union member states into a unified market of over 1.3 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) exceeding $3.4 trillion.
Relying on a vast regional market would mitigate the impact of external shocks, such as the revocation of preferential trade agreements like AGOA or the sudden imposition of steep tariffs. Given that trade between African nations currently accounts for only about 15–18 percent of the continent’s total trade, the AfCFTA aims to progressively eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of tariff lines, thereby stimulating internal commerce and providing a buffer against declines in Western markets caused by tariff fluctuations.
AGOA and many other external agreements have largely kept Africa in the role of a raw material supplier. In contrast, the AfCFTA encourages the development of regional value chains, where one African nation might produce raw materials, another processes them into finished goods, and the final product is sold to consumers within the continent, with fewer tariff barriers.
AfCFTA has made notable progress in developing the instruments needed for continental trade. The number of countries participating in trade initiatives under the agreement has grown to include South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Tunisia, making use of its preferential tariff arrangements.
The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), launched on January 13, 2022, enables banks and financial institutions to conduct cross-border transactions in African currencies, reducing reliance on foreign currencies such as the US dollar.
The African Union also adopted protocols on competition policy in February 2023 and digital trade in February 2024, aimed at promoting fair competition and facilitating e-commerce. In August 2026, the AfCFTA Secretariat signed an agreement to modernise and digitise customs systems. The AfCFTA Adjustment Fund has also been activated, with an estimated financing requirement of $8bn–$10bn, to support developing countries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as they adapt to the requirements of the single market.
For AfCFTA to serve its purpose and reduce dependence on volatile global trade agreements that prioritise Western interests over those of Africa, the continent still needs to accelerate economic integration by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and harmonising trade and regulatory policies to facilitate the smooth movement of goods and services.
To improve local markets, African countries must undertake the costly and risky investments involved in building cross-border infrastructure to reduce the cost of moving goods and services between African countries. Digital energy grids will be essential to this infrastructure, alongside roads and railways.
Africa must shift from simply exporting raw materials to building strong regional value chains focused on local manufacturing and innovation. Meeting the needs of the continent’s vast market would strengthen its economic self-sufficiency and reduce its vulnerability to external political decisions and the expiration of unilateral trade agreements.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
