Throughout Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, Europe’s position has, to an extent, been aligned.

Outliers such as Spain and the Republic of Ireland have long been more vocal in condemning Israel, but overall, the shift from unconditional solidarity with Israel to concern over its conduct has taken hold in much of the continent.

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Across the Balkans, divergent policies towards Israel reflect domestic calculations, transactional diplomacy, and unresolved identity politics rather than a shared vision for the Middle East, according to experts.

“The Balkan countries have almost no common positions at all, and so it’s not surprising their positions towards Israel and Gaza are all over the map,” Marko Prelec, analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera. “Each country goes its own way.”

Prelec noted that while there is genuine revulsion towards Israeli policy in Gaza and sympathy for Palestinians – particularly among Bosnian Muslims – most countries in the region take their positions based on unrelated interests.

Florian Bieber, professor of Southeast European history and politics at Austria’s University of Graz, said regional consensus is nearly impossible.

“The position towards Israel is strongly shaped by domestic politics and also national narratives, which makes a regional or even a country-specific position unlikely,” Bieber told Al Jazeera.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Differences from one entity to another

Nowhere is this fragmentation more evident than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the war in Gaza has deepened existing ethno-national divisions.

Bosniak political representatives and much of the public in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have expressed strong solidarity with Palestinians, while leaders in Republika Srpska have been openly pro-Israel, and some Croat political figures have also adopted a more sympathetic tone towards Israel.

“Bosniak solidarity with Palestinians is often seen not just through an ideological lens, but also from the perspective of war and being a victim of Serb nationalist aggression, comparing the Palestinian experience with the Bosniak experience in the 1990s,” Bieber explained.

Conversely, leaders in the Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska, led by former President Milorad Dodik, have openly embraced Israel.

Foreign policy analyst and journalist Bosko Jaksic told Al Jazeera that for Dodik, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend – Jews and Orthodox Serbs against Muslims. This religious and ethnic factor allows him to maintain an Israeli connection parallel to his closeness with Russia, while simultaneously performing a new American flip by glorifying [US President] Donald Trump.”

Prelec added that Bosnian Serb outreach to Israel and specifically Likud, the ruling Israeli party, represents “an attempt to find allies for its internationally unpopular flirtation with separatism, and an indirect way to strengthen ties with parts of the MAGA [Make America Great Again] movement and the Trump administration”.

Serbia: Arms sales and multi-vector balancing

In Serbia, the approach to Israel blends defence economics with foreign policy.

Despite historically friendly relations with Palestine and voting in favour of Palestinian membership in international bodies, Belgrade has exported ammunition and arms to Israel since October 2023.

The relationship has also moved beyond exports. In September, Serbia opened an Israeli-linked drone assembly plant, underlining the growing practical dimension of bilateral defence cooperation.

Vuk Vuksanovic, lecturer in foreign policy and grand strategy at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that Serbia’s defence industry “has not been particularly picky when it comes to its customers, and the desire for profit has been one of the factors”.

However, he emphasised broader geopolitical ambitions.

“In the past three years, there has been a tilt towards Israel regarding security cooperation, while diplomatically Serbia tries to be cautious in multilateral institutions due to its ties with the wider Islamic world,” he said.

Vuksanovic noted that Belgrade views Israel as a partner to “acquire the protection of Israeli lobby groups and access to the Trump administration in the US”, especially as the Serbian government faces domestic political opposition.

Meanwhile, Jaksic warned of the international risks involved.

“Due to the significant increase in ammunition exports to Israel during the war in Gaza, Serbia risks being accused of complicity in genocide,” he said. “Beyond financial calculations, the Serbian president attempts to use closeness with his ideological, authoritarian, and nationalist ally, [Israeli Prime Minister] Benjamin Netanyahu, to get closer to Trump.”

Kosovo, Albania, and the Washington anchor

For Kosovo and Albania, foreign policy regarding Israel remains anchored to security alliances with Washington.

Under the 2020 Washington Agreement, Kosovo recognised Israel in exchange for Israeli recognition of Kosovo’s independence, subsequently opening its embassy in Jerusalem. Serbia, which had pledged in 2020 to move its embassy to Jerusalem, ultimately did not do so.

Pristina opened its Jerusalem embassy “defying the stance of the wider international community”, said Jaksic.

“Israel’s growing influence in the Western Balkans is evident,” he noted. “That includes investments, and in the case of Serbia, especially military cooperation. This absolutely does not exclude personal attempts to buy political impunity from American sanctions, or to ease diplomatic pressure.”

In neighbouring Albania, Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government has preserved warm political ties with Israel.

Driven partly by operational defence needs, Albania deepened cooperation with Israeli cybersecurity companies after cyberattacks, while aligning broader diplomacy with Washington and Brussels.

Executive rifts and ideological turnarounds

In Croatia, foreign policy on Gaza has been paralysed by a sharp executive rift between conservative Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic and President Zoran Milanovic of the Social Democratic Party.

Plenkovic’s government has followed a cautious, mainstream European Union approach, while Milanovic has openly condemned Israel’s military conduct in Gaza, labelling it disproportionate and creating a public fracture in the country’s foreign policy leadership.

Further north in Slovenia, there are ideological shifts.

The previous centre-left government adopted firm measures against Israel – such as an arms embargo, a ban on imports from illegal settlements, and a ban on the entry of top officials like Netanyahu – as well as recognising Palestinian statehood.

Conservative forces under Prime Minister Janez Jansa have sought to reverse these policies.

“In Slovenia, we can see the classic left-right division where populist and far-right parties support Israel because of Netanyahu as a similar political actor,” said Bieber. “They recognise him as ideologically aligned, which helps reinforce their view of Islam as a threat, fitting their own narratives.”

Quiet alignment and strategic alliances

Smaller NATO members like Montenegro and North Macedonia have chosen a path of quiet alignment.

Both adhere to standard EU and NATO statements, calling for ceasefires and humanitarian aid while carefully avoiding high-profile bilateral disputes or bold independent diplomatic initiatives.

Further east, Romania and Bulgaria maintain a cautious tone that sometimes leans towards Israel. Grounded in historic bilateral relations and deep strategic defence partnerships with the United States, Bucharest and Sofia balance carefully worded statements at the United Nations with ongoing military and intelligence coordination.

Meanwhile, in Greece, consecutive governments in Athens have maintained a robust strategic military and energy partnership with Israel; Athens recently signed a $3.5bn missile deal with Israel. Originally forged alongside Cyprus to balance regional maritime rivalries in the Eastern Mediterranean, this alliance has held firm despite significant domestic public backlash and protests over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Ultimately, the disparate responses across the Balkans demonstrate that Middle Eastern policy in the region is rarely about the Middle East itself.

Whether driven by defence profits, constitutional rivalries, or the search for political backing in Washington, regional actors continue to view Israel almost exclusively through a transactional lens.