“You will get a file… from me or a colleague… with the proposed target. The file will contain [the target’s] photo, his data, his details, date of birth, age, and a description of him. There’ll be information on his car, if he has one. When you go to the target, don’t take a phone,” he told his volunteers.
Foma was once part of the Russian elite, so he claims to have a unique set of contacts and constant flow of insider information.
He showed Mamon on his laptop how he mapped military targets.
“This shows a database… the location of storage warehouses, and military units. Where generals live… Where the pilots of strategic bombers who shell Ukraine live.
“In order to break the system, you need to understand how it works. Then you can aim for their weak points.”
He said there were about “three dozen” people in his network split between Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, with the contingent outside Russia providing logistical support, such as tracking targets’ digital footprints.
Foma stressed that the GUR suggests the targets to be surveilled, but that he and his team check for themselves that these individuals should be considered military criminals.
“As a rule… we also check the data [on that person]… Only after that we say whether we work or not.”
But he argued that his team’s actions were justified.
“I want people who do terrible things on behalf of Putin and Russia in Ukraine… to understand that they’ll have to pay for it. I want them to get scared.”
Foma stressed that he only passed on intelligence to the Ukrainians, and his network did not carry out any assassinations themselves.
Of the assassination of Gen Sarvarov, killed in December 2025, he later texted Mamon to say: “Keeping track of him took quite an effort. He lived alternately with his mistress and his colleague. Covered his tracks and constantly changed his schedule.”
But Foma did not share any plans with Mamon and the BBC in advance.
Ivan, however, was tight-lipped about the work he had been involved with, even after the event.
Foma did his own digging on Ivan.
After checking with his military intelligence contacts in both Ukraine and Russia, he thought it likely that Ivan had been involved in a plan to strike Russia’s largest military drone factory at Yelabuga in June last year. One person was reported to have been killed in the incident.
Ivan stressed that the aim is always to try to avoid harming civilians.
Operations have clearly been risky for Ivan too.
“The most serious case was when my car was stopped for inspection and I had the handmade explosives on me. The risk was very high – however as you can see, I was not detected,” he said.
To mitigate the risk of being compromised, “there is no clear structure” to the work, he said, adding he had never met and did not know the identity of others he had been working alongside.
Foma has the same rule for his operatives.
“As soon as you start gathering people in groups, in general chats… leaving a mark on the internet, with a high probability this whole group will be quickly detained or destroyed,” he said.
Ivan stressed there were few people left in Russia suitable for this kind of work.
“Most of the ideological people have either left the country or are already behind bars,” he said.
Many Russians involved in sabotage work on their native soil are therefore either oblivious – for example lorry drivers unaware that their cargoes have been compromised – or are individuals who have been paid, the BBC understands.
Ivan, on the other hand, says he is doing this work for ideological reasons – he used to be a member of the political opposition. As such, his movements would be expected to be monitored closely by the Russian authorities.
So it was a surprise that he managed to frequently leave Russia and return.